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Albert Einstein once said:
We scientists recognize our inescapable responsibility to carry to our fellow
citizens an understanding of the simple facts of atomic energy and its implica-
tions for society. In this lies our only security and our only hope-we believe
that an informed citizenry will act for life and not death.'
Einstein was discussing the knowledge of the atomic bomb. The
Progressive2 case was also about knowledge, but knowledge of a more
severe threat. The case concerned the hydrogen bomb (the thermonuclear
or fusion reaction), a force which is 100 times more powerful than an
atomic bomb (the fission reaction). The case dealt with great
consequences-the consequences of error involving human life on an
awesome scale. Excepting obscenity cases, The Progressive was under the
longest prior restraint in history.4 However, the courts never had a chance
to fully determine the need for a prior restraint. Another newspaper,
unknown to most everyone, including the Justice Department, printed the
information, forcing the Government to drop its suit against The Progres-
sive.
Since there was no appellate court decision, the primary focus of this
Note will not be an in-depth critique of the trial court decision. Instead, the
author intends to give the reader a thorough understanding of the histori-
cal basis for and the development of The Progressive case. To aid in
analysis of the issues and effects of the case upon the press, the Note
presents a brief review of the history of prior restraint and the details of the
Pentagon Papers cases. 5 The Note then considers the effects of the Pentag-
on Papers cases and how they set the stage for The Progressive case. Press
reaction to The Progressive and the effects of the case's mooting is next
examined. Finally, the Note examines the future. For example, could a
similar case arise again? If so, how would the Supreme Court react? Will
the Atomic Energy Act withstand a constitutional challenge? What else
might the Government do? And how will the press react to all of this?
I. Letter from Albert Einstein (Jan. 22, 1947) (appealing for support for the Emergency
Committee of Atomic Scientists), quoted in No Defense, THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 17.
2. United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
3. Id. at 995.
4. The previous longest prior restraint in history was in the Pentagon Papers cases, New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), in which both the New York Times and the
Washington Post were enjoined from publication for ten and seven days respectively. The Progressive
was enjoined for over six months. For a discussion of the doctrine of prior restraint, see text
accompanying notes 76-145 infra.
5. The popular name refers to New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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I. The Progressive Case AND THE
HISTORY OF PRIOR RESTRAINT
A. The Progressive Case
The target of the longest prior restraint in history was The Progressive
magazine's article planned for its April 1979 issue6 entitled: The H-Bomb
Secret-How we got it, why we're telling it. The Progressive was founded
in 1909 by Senator Robert LaFollette. It has a nationwide circulation of
40,000, a national reputation for political analysis and commentary, and
has previously published many articles about the nuclear arms race and
proliferation.
The defendant editors, Erwin Knoll8 and Samuel Day, Jr.,9 decided to
print the article to puncture the myth of secrecy that resulted in discourag-
ing debate on policy issues involving national security, energy, environ-
mental protection, and allocation of human and natural resources.' °
Morland said:
Knowledge of the basic principles of hydrogen weapon design ... provides
insight into the purposes of continued nuclear testing . . . and the devastat-
ing effects of nuclear war." . . . We have less to fear from knowing than
from not knowing. What we do with the knowledge may be the key to our
survival. 2
The idea for The Progressive's article was conceived in early 1978. In
April 1978, Day contacted the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of
Public Affairs to arrange a tour of facilities engaged in nuclear weapons
production. He visited three government production facilities in late June
1978 with DOE's permission and cooperation. About this time he met
writer-defendant Howard Morland, who had already done extensive
research in the area.
1 3
6. The article was eventually published in THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 14.
7. Bagdikian, A Most Insidious Case, THE QUILL, June 1979, at 22.
8. Knoll is the coauthor of a book entitled ANYTHING BUT THE TRUTH: HOW THE NEWS IS
MANAGED IN WASHINGTON, was on the Nixon enemies list, and worked as a reporter for the Washing-
ton Post and a Washington correspondent for The Progressive. He is known for his strong views and
his battles with government agencies and policies. See Friedman, infra note 13, at 28.
9. Day worked as an editor of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and has written extensively about
nuclear weapons.
10. Morland, The H-Bomb Secret-How we got it, why we're telling it, THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov.
1979, at 23.
11. Id. at 17.
12. Id. at 23.
13. Morland had grown up in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where many of the components for
hydrogen bombs were manufactured, and had been exposed at an early age to what he calls the
"mystique of nuclear scientists." He was a pilot during the Vietnam conflict, which increased his
awareness of the H-bomb. In the spring of 1977 he took part in a sit-in demonstration at the site of the
Seabrook nuclear plant in New Hampshire and spent two weeks as a prisoner in the Portsmouth
National Guard Armory. When released he decided to devote himself to anti-nuclear issues that he felt
people were not protesting because "they didn't have the information. They didn't know where the
weapons are made, how they work, how many there are, or even what they do." He then began his
research to discover the "secret of the H-bomb." For extensive discussion of Morland's background,
see Friedman, United States v. The Progressive, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July/Aug. 1979, at 30
[Vol. 41:1 1651166
PRIOR RESTRAINT
After meeting Morland and assigning the article, Day notified the
DOE that Morland would continue the project. The DOE agreed to
cooperate. With the Government's help Morland toured most of the
plants at which bomb components are manufactured. The Government set
up ground rules that allowed Morland to ask any questions he wanted,
but left it to the person he was interviewing to cut him off if his questions
involved classified data. In the course of his research he was told how to
obtain an unclassified version of a nuclear generator, he conducted a full-
length interview with plant officials about technical aspects of bomb com-
ponents, and he photographed every weapon on display in the National
Atomic Museum in Albuquerque. He was told only once his questions
were off-limits.
1 4
The Progressive claimed that M orland identified himself as a journa-
list during all the interviews and had no access to classified documents. 5
However, the Government claimed he used pseudonyms to obtain the
information. 16 In the course of this research he collected a six-foot-high
stack of books and public documents, including an Encyclopedia Ameri-
cana entry by Edward Teller, the "father of the hydrogen bomb."'7 His
research led to an initial article about tritium published in the February
1979 issue.18 The DOE made no objections.
In February 1979, Morland sent the magazine his eighteen-page
manuscript on the bomb "secret." To verify accuracy, Day and Morland
mailed copies of an incomplete draft of the article to a few scientists and
acquaintances. One of them, a student at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), gave a copy to George William Rathjens, a govern-
ment affiant and professor at MIT. He in turn sent the draft to the DOE's
director of classification. After learning this, Day sent a complete draft,
along with the sketches and captions for the article, to the DOE. In a letter
accompanying the article Day stated that it contained "technical informa-
tion pertaining to hydrogen weapon design and manufacture," and asked
for verification of the article's technical accuracy. The article was received
on February 27.
Two days later the DOE notified Day and Knoll that the article
contained "restricted data" as defined by the Atomic Energy Act (the
Act), 19 which requires such data to be classified information. They also
informed the editors that publication of the article would injure the United
States and give an advantage to foreign nations. The next day DOE
14. Friedman, supra note 13, at 30.
15. Public Brief for Appellant at 5, United States v. The Progressive, Nos. 79-1428,79-1664 (7th
Cir. docketed April 12, 1979). See Morland, supra note 10, at 23, for a discussion of how Morland
obtained the "secret."
16. Public Brief for Appellee at 72, United States v.The Progressive, Nos. 79-1428,79-1664 (7th
Cir. docketed April 12, 1979).
17. TELLER, Hydrogen Bomb, 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA (1976).
18. THE PROGRESSIVE, Feb. 1979.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(y) (1976).
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officials flew to Madison, met with the editors, and informed them that
publication of the article would violate the Act. The editors expressed their
conviction that the information was obtained entirely from sources in the
public domain. The government officials claimed, however, that about
twenty percent of the text (approximately six pages) and all the captioned
sketches contained "restricted data." They refused to specify which parts
were restricted, but offered to rewrite the article.
On March 7, The Progressive's counsel notified the DOE that the
magazine intended to publish the article. The DOE filed an action request-
ing a preliminary injunction the following day in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. The judge, the Honorable
James E. Doyle, disqualified himself and the case was transferred to the
Eastern District of Wisconsin, in which court the Honorable Robert W.
Warren was assigned the case.2 ° On March 9, Judge Warren held a hearing
on the Government's request for a temporary restraining order to enjoin
the defendants from publishing or disclosing the restricted data in the
article. The court issued the order2 l and scheduled the hearing on the
preliminary injunction. When he granted the order in open court Judge
Warren said: "I want to think a long, hard time before I'd give a hydrogen
bomb to Idi Amin. It appears to me that is what we're doing here. 22
On March 26, Judge Warren granted the injunction 3 under the
authority of section 2280 of the Act.24 Judge Warren decided the case
totally on the basis of the affidavits submitted by the parties.2 5 He prefaced
his opinion by quoting the Supreme Court's opinion in New York Times
Co. v. United States26 that, although any prior restraint on publication
comes under judicial scrutiny with a heavy presumption against its consti-
tutional validity, first amendment rights are not absolute.2 7 Warren then
stated that the case had met the requirements of the national security
exception for prior restraint recognized by the Supreme Court in Near v.
Minnesota.2 The court determined that the concepts in the article were not
in the public domain, 9 were not declassified, 0 could provide a medium-
20. Warren is a former Wisconsin attorney general with a "law and order" reputation. He was
appointed to the federal bench by Nixon in 1974. See Friedman, supra note 13, at 31.
21. United States v. The Progressive, Inc., No. 79-C-98 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 9,1979) (order granting
temporary restraining order).
22. Friedman, supra note 13, at 31.
23. 467 F. Supp. 990, 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2280 requires the Government to show that the material incorporates restricted
data as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2014(y).
25. 467 F. Supp. 990, 992 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
26. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
27. 467 F. Supp. 990, 992 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
28. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Chief Justice Hughes in Near said: "No one would question but that a
government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing
dates of transports or the number and location of troops." Id. at 716.
29. 467 F. Supp. 990, 993 (W.D. Wis. 1979). The court continued:
Even if some of the information is in the public domain, due recognition must be given to the
human skills and expertise involved in writing this article. The author needed sufficient
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size nation with sufficient information to move faster to produce hydrogen
bombs,3" and could increase the number of nations that have thermonu-
clear weapons.3
2
The judge then voiced his opinion that he could "find no plausible
reason why the public needs to know the technical details about hydrogen
bomb construction to carry on an informed debate on this issue, 33 a
comment for which he has been much criticized.34 The court distinguished
The Progressive article from New York Times by commenting that the
Pentagon Papers discussed historical events whose publication did not
possess the threat of future harm as did publication in the present case. He
found the Atomic Energy Act not to be unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad.35 Judge Warren concluded that the defendants had reason to
believe the publication would injure the United States or secure an advan-
tage to a foreign nation as stated in section 2274(b) of the Act, and held
publication would meet the New York Times standard of "direct, imme-
diate and irreparable" damage.36
The decision stressed a heirarchy of rights-the potential to nullify the
freedom of speech compared with life itself. Asserting a view of the need
for practicality, Judge Warren stated, "While it may be true in the long run,
as Patrick Henry instructs us, that one would prefer death to life without
liberty, nonetheless, in the short-run, one cannot enjoy freedom of speech,
freedom to worship or freedom of the press unless one first enjoys the
freedom to live. 37
The district court opinion consisted of blunt statements to the effect
that every facet of the Government's argument had prevailed over the
defendants'. The opinion revealed few of the judge's thought processes in
issuing the injunction. With due deference to Judge Warren-this case
may well have been the most difficult he has ever had to decide-the
opinion reflected little else than his fear and his certainty that the case
would reach the Supreme Court.
The judge attempted to base the decision wholly on his factual
determination that the material was not in the public domain. Based on the
affidavits of scientists and government officials presented to him in cam-
era, he agreed with the Government that the combination of materials
Morland discovered through "educated guesses" and "asking the right
expertise to recognize relevant, as opposed to irrelevant, information and to assimilate
the information obtained. The right questions had to be asked or the current educated
guesses had to be made.
30. Id. at 998.
31. Id. at 993, 999.
32. Id. at 994, 999.
33. Id. at 994.
34. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 13, at 33.
35. 467 F. Supp. 990, 994 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
36. Id. at 999.
37. Id. at 995.
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questions"" was not in the public domain, and was therefore a national
security threat.39
He let himself become overwhelmed by the government officials who
suggested the potential harm.4° Every statement in the opinion suggested
only conjecture-a probability of harm. He said the article "could possi-
bly" provide sufficient information to allow a medium-size nation to move
faster in developing the weapons 1 and that it "could" accelerate the
42
number of nations that obtain the hydrogen bomb. He did not explain,
however, how the legal standards of "could" and "possible" square with the
New York Times standard of "direct, immediate, and irreparable" harm.
Nor did Judge Warren explain how, if a journalist with no scientific
background could investigate the matter and learn to "ask the right
questions," foreign spies and scientists could not do, and have not already
done, the same thing. It is extremely naive to think that a foreign intelli-
gence network has less ability to discover this information than a lay
American journalist.
The judge attempted to rebut The Progressive's argument that the
information was easy to obtain by saying "only" five countries have a
hydrogen bomb.43 He failed to explain, however, how the other four
nations obtained the information, which originally only the United States
had. He even admitted that "one does not build a hydrogen bomb in the
basement," 44 but did not carry this to the logical conclusion that, just
because only five countries have the hydrogen bomb, only five have the
knowledge to build a hydrogen bomb. What most countries lack is not the
knowledge, but the massive resources to build a bomb.
With his comment that he saw no plausible reason for the need to
print the technical information,45 Judge Warren acted in an unprecedented
manner by judging for himself what information the public needs to know.
This decision belongs to the press, for it is explicitly this type of decision
that the first amendment was intended to protect. The judge's view, or even
the prevailing public view, that technical information is not needed for
public debate on policy does not mean The Progressive's editors had no
right to print it. A prior restraint must be based on the strict standards of
imminent and grave harm, not a judge's conclusion that the defendant's
ideas are absurd. Judge Warren furthered his attack on the editors' mo-
tives, stating that publication would harm their position against nuclear
nonproliferation.46 He might have been correct, but this was only his
38. Id. at 993.
39. Id. at 995.
40. Friedman, supra note 13, at 33.
41. 467 F. Supp. 990, 993, 999 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 994.
44. Id. at 993.




opinion and not a fact that should have been taken into account in the
decision.
In his blind acceptance of the Government's argument, Judge Warren
virtually ignored the potential constitutional problems the Atomic Energy
Act presents. In one sentence he summarily stated that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, 47 but never mentioned the consti-
tutional issue again. He never gave any reason or basis for this conclusion,
appearing to have accepted the statute's constitutionality at face value.
This was a serious error, as the Act's constitutionality, as will be shown
later, is extremely doubtful. The Act has never been tested in court, and if
read as the Government argued, represents a grave threat to the first
amendment. 8
The judge's heirarchy-of-right argument might be logical if it were
based on an open-minded view of the facts. In expressing the "disparity of
risk"49 and the "awesome" consequences of error involving human life,50 he
once again forgot that the danger already exists and has existed since the
Soviet Union built its first hydrogen bomb. He justified his opinion by
balancing what he perceived as this immediate risk against that of a prior
restraint which would not "in any plausible fashion impede the defendants
in their laudable crusade to . . . bring about enlightened debate. .. .
He erred by once again relying on his personal opinion that the informa-
tion was not necessary for public debate. In the process, he denigrated
Patrick Henry and the impact of Henry's famous statement upon freedom
of our nation.
Judge Warren further justified his opinion by commenting on the
press' fears that taking the case to the Supreme Court would create
permanent harm to the first amendment,52 a press view that is hypocritical
in itself.53 Furthermore, the court's job is to interpret the law, not public
opinion.
The reality that the case was undoubtedly headed for the Supreme
Court may have been the biggest factor in the decision. Judge Warren
appeared not to want to risk his reputation; he essentially passed the buck.
In deference to the press' fears, he offered the parties an opportunity
to avoid a test in the Supreme Court through mediation. 4 The Progressive
turned down the offer, however, and the injunction was issued.
After the injunction was issued, the American Civil Liberties Union
began assisting in preparation for the appeal. On May 7, an ACLU
47. Id.
48. See text accompanying notes 242-65 infra for a discussion of the Act and potential interpre-
tation in the future.
49. 467 F. Supp. 990, 995 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 996.
52. Id.
53. See text accompanying notes 178-99 infra for a discussion of the press reaction to the case.
54. 467 F. Supp. 990, 997 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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researcher visited the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Library in New
Mexico, which contains the world's most extensive collection of informa-
tion related to nuclear weapons and is the only DOE library that permits
some public access. 55 The researcher found a document entitled the Uni-
versity of California Radiation Laboratory Report (UCRL) 4725 on an
unrestricted access shelf that contained the basic design principles for a
hydrogen bomb. A copy machine was also available.
On May 23 a Senate subcommitee held hearings 56 to investigate the
matter, and discovered the document had been "inadvertently declassi-
fied" from April 1977 to May 1979. The committee also learned that
another, more sensitive document, UCRL 5280, had been freely available
to the public from April 1977 to May 1978. Shortly thereafter, the Govern-
ment closed the library. The Government asserted that the documents had
been placed on open shelves by clerical errors57 and that the material was
classified, but erroneously marked "declassified. 58
In preparation for a district court hearing to vacate the preliminary
injunction, The Progressive made a motion that the court allow oral
testimony and cross-examination at the hearing. The court denied the
motion.59
The Progressive supplemented its motion to vacate with the informa-
tion gathered at Los Alamos, reiterated its request for oral argument, and
asked for limited discovery. The court denied this motion also and restrict-
ed the hearing to in camera oral arguments.6 ° After refusing to consider
The Progressive's evidence of access to the library, the district court on
June 15 denied the motion to vacate the preliminary injunction. 61 This
seven-page opinion was secret and Judge Warren made only a brief public
statement. The district court sealed all the documents presented in the case,
which included affidavits, library materials, and one of Morland's college
textbooks that he had underlined.
The Progressive then filed a petition in the United States Supreme
Court for a writ of mandamus to expedite the hearing in the court of
55. The library has 290,000 volumes of books and journals; 500,000 reports;4,500journaltitles;
and other publications, all dealing with weapons programs. Not all the information is publicly
available. Public Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 18-19, United States v. The Progressive, Nos. 79-
1428, 79-1664 (7th Cir. docketed April 12, 1979).
56. The Release of Classied Nuclear Weapons Information: Hearings Before the Senate
Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Services, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
57. Appellee's Public Brief at 20, United States v. The Progressive, Nos. 79-1428,79-1664 (7th
Cir. docketed April 12, 1979).
58. Id. at 77.
59. United States v. The Progressive, Inc., No. 79-C-98 (W.D. Wis. May 30, 1979) (order
denying motion to allow oral testimony and cross-examination at hearing to vacate injunction).
60. United States v. The Progressive, Inc., No. 79-C-98 (W.D. Wis. June 5, 1979) (order
denying supplemental motion to vacate preliminary injunction and to allow oral testimony and limited
discovery).
61. United States v. The Progressive, Inc., No. 79-C-98 (W.D. Wis. June 15, 1979) (order
denying motion to vacate preliminary injunction).
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appeals. It was denied on July 2 in a per curiam opinion, essentially
because The Progressive itself had delayed in filing.62
During the summer of 1979 the issue caught the attention of scientists,
writers, and other publications.63 In its July/ August issue the Columbia
Journalism Review announced that it, too, had learned the secret. 4 The
case also caught the attention of writer Charles R. Hansen,65 who had been
collecting documents on nuclear energy since 1971. He prepared an eight-
een page letter to Senator Charles H. Percy about the availability of
nuclear weapons design information. He claimed that three scientists had
breached security, particularly in discussion with Morland, and included
his research on "the secret." He sent copies to eight newspapers including
the Daily Californian, which is the University of California at Berkeley
student newspaper, and the Madison Press Connection.66 Hansen pro-
vided the government with a copy of the article and a list of the publica-
tions to which he had sent it. This list, however, did not include the Press
Connection. The Government contacted all the publications and, when
only the Daily Californian said it planned to publish, obtained a restrain-
ing order against it on September 15 in San Francisco.
The Press Connection first published an article on September 15
saying it would publish the information. The next day it ran the article in a
special edition. 67 Two days later, after notifying the Government of its
intentions to do so, the Chicago Tribune reprinted the letter. According to
Hansen, his information came from a Time magazine article,68 the 1976
speeches of visiting Soviet scientists, and the Encyclopedia Americana
diagram.69
On September 17, only one week after the oral arguments in the
Seventh Circuit, the Justice Department announced it would move for
dismissal of the case. It also dropped the injunction against the Daily
Californian.
The Progressive article finally went to press on October 1 and was
printed in the November edition. 70 The article itself is ten pages and
62. Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709 (1979).
63. See Day, The other nuclear weapons club, THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 32-35, for a
detailed discussion of other scientists and writers who also became involved in the hunt for public
information.
64. Comment, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July/Aug. 1979, at 22.
65. Hansen was a computer programmer from Mountain View, California, who had been
researching nuclear energy in his free time. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 1, 1979, at 45. See Day, supra note 63, at
33-34, for a detailed discussion of Hansen's actions.
66. The Press Connection was started in Oct. 1977 by striking employees of the Madison Times
and the Wisconsin State Journal. The small, struggling daily paper has a circulation of 11,000 and a
staff of 48 fulltime and 9 part-time members. Consoli, The Progressive triumphs in H-bomb case,
EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Sept. 22, 1979, at 9.
67. Press Connection, Sept. 16, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
68. TIME, Apr. 12, 1954, at 21.
69. Teller, supra note 17.
70. THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 14. See the entire issue for several articles detailing various
aspects of the case.
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includes seven schematic diagrams, one of which is reproduced on the
cover. In the article Morland declares:
Why am I telling you? It's not because I want to help you build an H-bomb.
Have no fear, that would be beyond your capability-unless you have the
resources of at least a medium-sized government. . . . I am telling the secret
to make a basic point as forcefully as I can: Secrecy itself, especially the power
of a few designated "experts" to declare some topics off limits, contributes to
a political climate in which the nuclear establishment can conduct business as
usual, protecting and perpetuating the production of these horrible weap-
ons.
7 1
After the Justice Department dropped the suit, The Progressive filed a
motion with the district court to modify the protective order that governed
all in camera material filed in the case. On February 8, 1980, Judge Warren
signed an order making public the previously secret opinion on the motion
to vacate the preliminary injunction.72
For over six months the parties negotiated a settlement as to the
remaining sealed documents that had been submitted in camera. On
September 4, 1980 the Justice Department announced it would not prose-
cute anyone. At that time, both parties signed a stipulation releasing
between ninety and ninety-five percent of the sealed documents. Only five
to ten percent of the material remains in camera, including UCRL 4725.
Additionally, by stipulation, the parties designated another five to ten
percent as "sensitive. 73 The released material included a substantial
amount of articles and affidavits submitted by the Government. The
remaining in camera material is classified information that was peripheral
to the case.74
The Progressive then filed a motion with the court requesting Warren
to repudiate his prior opinion. He declined the offer, and The Progressive
does not intend to pursue the issue.75
B. History of Prior Restraint
To fully appreciate the impact of The Progressive and its subsequent
mooting, a clear understanding of the theory of the doctrine of prior
restraint and the history of its development is necessary. Of particular
importance are the Pentagon Papers cases, their effect upon the press, and
the backdrop they set for The Progressive case.
The concept of prior restraint deals essentially with the official restric-
tions imposed upon speech or other forms of expression in advance of
actual publication.76 It is distinguished from another form of restriction on
71. Id.
72. United States v. The Progressive, Inc., No. 79-C-98 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 1980) (order making
public the previously secret opinion).
73. Conversation with Earl Munson, Jr., attorney for The Progressive (Sept. 5, 1980).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 J. OF L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955).
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speech-subsequent punishment-which does not block publication in
advance but attempts to deter it by causing fear of the resulting punish-
ment. Prior restraints have historically been considered more threatening
to the first amendment than subsequent punishment. This belief is ex-
pressed by noted first amendment scholar Thomas Emerson:
A system of prior restraint is in many ways more inhibiting than a system of
subsequent punishment. . . .It is likely to bring under government scrutiny
a far wider range of expression; ...[A]s the system allows less opportunity
for public appraisal and criticism, the dynamics of the system drive toward
excesses.
77
One of the major differences between a criminal prosecution and a
prior restraint is the criminal defendant's right to assert the first amend-
ment defense. But when a prior restraint operates, a defendant who ignores
the imposed restraint loses the right to assert the defense in a subsequent
prosecution for ignoring the restraint rather than obeying it while chal-
lenging it. 73 A further distinction is the censors' tendency toward "unintel-
ligent, overzealous, and usually absurd" administration. 79 The decisions
often rest with a single government official, providing an opportunity for
discrimination and abuse.80 Prior restraint can also deter a greater amount
of expression with far less expenditure of time, funds, energy, and person-
nel than subsequent punishment.8 l
1. Early Development of Prior Restraint
State action against an individual for publishing "dangerous
thoughts" has existed for centuries. In 1633 Galileo was tried by the
Inquisition for publishing a book that confirmed the Copernican thesis
that the earth revolved around the sun rather than the opposite.82
Prior restraint began in England in 1501 after the invention of the
printing press, when Pope Alexander VI established a policy of prior
restraint by banning unlicensed printing.83 During the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries the complexity and amount of prior restraint greatly
increased. The Licensing Act of 1662 created sweeping controls.8 4 Eventu-
ally the laws expired and were never revived. "In the course of the eight-
eenth century, freedom of the press from licensing came to assume the
77. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 506 (Ist ed. 1970). See also A. BICKEL,
THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1st ed. 1975), in which Bickel says: "A criminal statute chills, prior
restraint freezes."
78. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 726 (1978).
79. Emerson, supra note 76, at 658. See also Note, Prior Restraint and the Press Following the
Pentagon Papers Cases-Is the Immunity Dissolving?, 47 NOTRE DAME LAw. 927, 931 (1972).
80. Note, supra note 79, at 931.
81. Emerson, supra note 76, at 656-60.
82. Bagdikian, supra note 7, at 24.
83. Emerson, supra note 76, at 650. See also Note, The Purloined Pentagon Papers and Prior
Restraint: The Press Prevailed!, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 81, 91 (1971).
84. Emerson, supra note 76, at 650.
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status of a common-law or natural right. 85 Blackstone commented on the
law in his well-known passage: "The liberty of the press is indeed essential
to the nature of a free state, but this consists in laying no previous restraints
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter
when published. 86
Events in America paralleled those in England. Blackstone's com-
ment represented the dominant belief in 1791 when the first amendment
was adopted. It was argued then that the first amendment was not intended
to cover subsequent punishment. 87 This issue was settled, however, in
Schenck v. United States,88 which required that the famous "clear and
present danger" test be used to determine whether the speech could be
punished. In Near v. Minnesota89 the Court reiterated that "it is the chief
purpose of the [first amendment] guaranty to prevent previous restraints
upon publication."90 The Court held that an injunction issued under a state
statute regulating "malicious, scandalous and defamatory matter" was an
unconstitutional prior restraint. Chief Justice Hughes noted in the majori-
ty opinion, however, that freedom from prior restraint is not absolute. The
Chief Justice listed three exceptions, including obscenity and laws against
incitement to violence or revolution, and then stated: "[N]o one would
question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its
recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the
number and location of troops." 91 Near is important because the Court for
the first time vigorously and effectively enunciated the doctrine of prior
restraint.92
However, Near left many questions unanswered: What constituted
the national security exception? What must the Government prove to take
advantage of the exception? Until New York Times, no decision had
squarely faced these questions, although throughout American history
there had been considerable conflict between national security and the first
amendment.
Government attempts to suppress information deemed harmful to
national security date back to 1797, when General George Washington
first complained of press leaks.93 During the Civil War the press agreed to
85. Id. at 651.
86. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52. The passage continued: "Every free man has an
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the
freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the
consequences of his own temerity."
87. Emerson, supra note 76, at 652.
88. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).See Note, supra note 83, at 93-94 for a detailed discussion of Schenck, a
case concerning a conviction under the Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 218-19 (1917)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1976)).
89. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
90. Id. at 713.
91. Id. at 716.
92. Emerson, supra note 76, at 654.
93. Comment, The National Security Exception to the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 13 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 214 (1971).
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refrain from printing material that might aid the enemy, but there were
many breaches.94 Eventually, President Lincoln issued a sweeping order
providing for the court-martial of correspondents whose reports were
found to be of aid to the enemy. 95
The Espionage Act of 191796 was passed after the outbreak of World
War I and spelled out detailed offenses, but the Government relied on
voluntary censorship by the press.97 In World War II the Government
again relied on voluntary censorship organized through the Office of Cen-
sorship, which issued a code on wartime practices.98 The program worked
well99 with two notable exceptions. The Chicago Tribune and Washington
Times-Herald published the Government's secret war mobilization plans
only three days prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, 100 and in 1942 the
Tribune was accused of leaking the fact that the United States had broken
the Japanese Naval Code. 10'
Since the end of World War II official secrecy mushroomed with the
impact of the cold war and the nuclear weapons race.10 2 Congress passed
the Atomic Energy Act in 1946. A preview of The Progressive case
occurred in 1950 when the Government used the Act to censor an article in
Scientific American on the technical aspects of the atomic bomb. The
editors decided not to fight the case, but it was later discovered that the
article was censored because President Truman did not want public debate
on the issue.l°3 Years later it was found that the censored material in the
article had been previously published, partially in the same magazine.
10 4
National defense was defined in Gorin v. United States as "a generic
concept of broad connotations, referring to the military and naval estab-
lishments and the related activities of national preparedness."10 5 In United
States v. Heine'0 6 Judge Learned Hand redefined it as excluding national
defense information that was already in the public domain.
During the early 1960s the Court developed a standard for testing all
systems of prior restraints in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,'0 7 saying that
94. Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 1130, 1193 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
95. Comment, supra note 93, at 214.
96. Ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 218-19 (1917) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1976)).
97. See Developments in the Law, supra note 94, at 1193, for a more detailed discussion of the
World War I press controls and interwar years developments.
98. Id. at 1194.
99. See Developments in the Law, supra note 94, for a further discussion of the program.
100. Comment, supra note 93, at 215.
101. Id.
102. See Buell, Atomic secrecy:fuel for the cold var, THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 24, for a
discussion of the release of atomic bomb information and the resulting wave of secrecy.
103. Bagdikian, supra note 7, at 26.
104. Friedman, supra note 13, at 29.
105. 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941).
106. 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945).
107. 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
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any system of prior restraint of expression comes to the court bearing "a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." The standard was
reiterated in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,'0 8 in which the
Court said the Government carries a heavy burden of showing justification
for the imposition of such a restraint
2. The Pentagon Papers Cases-
New York Times v. United States
When New York Times reached the Supreme Court in 1971, the Court
once again cited Near, Bantam Books, and Organization for a Better
Austin, and in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion held that the Govern-
ment had not met its burden. 109
In New York Times the Government sought to block the New York
Times' and Washington Post's publication of the Pentagon Papers, a
classified document that had been stolen by Daniel Ellsberg." 0 The papers
described activities in Vietnam prior to 1968 and President Johnson's
decision to escalate the conflict. The Government claimed that publication
would prolong the war, endanger national security, and embarrass United
States' diplomatic activities. The Justice Department sought to fit the case
into the Near military exception.
The action was filed, litigated, and decided within eighteen days. The
New York Times introduced the first installment on Sunday, January 13,
1971, with a rather dull headline-"Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study
Traces 3 Decades of Growing U.S. Involvement.""' The Timesprintedthe
information because it felt it was the "press' fundamental responsibility" to
publish information that "helps the people of the United States to under-
stand their own government processes," but stated it would not have
published it if there had been reason to believe it endangered the nation's
security.' 1 2 The Times printed two more daily installments." 3 Publication
of the document, which proved extremely embarrassing to the Govern-
ment, sent shock waves throughout the White House, Congress, and the
Departments of State, Defense, and Justice. It created deep concerns with
allies as well.
114
On June 15 the Government, after asking the paper to voluntarily
cease publication, obtained a temporary restraining order from the federal
district court in Manhattan;".5 however, on June 19 the court denied the
108. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
109. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
110. The leak was called the greatest leak of classified information in the history of the United
States. TIME, June 28, 1971, at 11. Ellsberg was a former governmentconsultant and Pentagon official.
111. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
112. Id. at44, col. 1.
113. N.Y. Times, June 14, 1971, at 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, June 15, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
114. For a more detailed discussion of official reaction, see Note, supra note 83, at 82.
115. United States v. New York Times Co., No. 71 Civ. 2662 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 1971) (order
granting temporary restraining order).
1178 [Vol. 41:1165
PRIOR RESTRAINT
request for a preliminary injunction.' 16 Meanwhile, on June 18, the Wash-
ington Post had published part of the document.' 17 After being denied a
temporary restraining order by the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia,"' the Government obtained one from the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 1 9
On June 21 the District Court for the District of Columbia denied the
Government's request for a preliminary injunction. 120 On June 23 both
courts of appeals rendered decisions. The Second Circuit found for the
Government but remanded the case to the district court for additional
proceedings. 121 The District of Columbia Circuit, however, ruled in favor
of the Post.122 On June 25 the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari
and scheduled arguments for the next day.123 The Court announced its
decision on June 30.124
During the Pentagon Papers litigation the Government vigorously
argued that publication would directly cause deaths of American prisoners
of war, soldiers, CIA agents, and employees of other Governments. One
factor that most certainly injured the Government's case, and that makes
The Progressive case comparable, is that one of the documents the Gov-
ernment dramatically presented during the in camera proceedings to
show its "worst case of damage" was discovered by a reporter to have
already been an officially published government document. 125 This may
have been the single event, more than any other, that helped the press win
the Pentagon Papers cases.1
26
Since ten separate opinions were written in the case, including the
brief per curiam opinion, it is virtually impossible to come to any single
New York Times standard for prior restraint. However, a six-three majori-
ty of the Court apparently restricted the cases of prior restraint to at least a
very narrow area. The opinions ranged from those of Justices Black and-
Douglas, who expressed absolutist views of the first amendment, to that of
Justice Blackmun, who expressed fear that the publications may have.
caused serious harm to national security.
Justice Black, who was joined by Justice Douglas, advanced the
absolutist view that the first amendment forbids all injunctions. He would
116. United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
117. Wash. Post, June 18, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
118. United States v. Washington Post Co., No. 71-1487 (D.D.C. June 18,1971) (order denying
temporary restraining order).
119. United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
120. United States v. Washington Post Co., No. 71-1487 (D.D.C. June 21, 1971) (order denying
preliminary injunction).
121. United States v. New York Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971).
122. United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
123. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 942 (1971) (mem.).
124. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
125. Bagdikian, supra note 7, at 26.
126. Id.
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not even have allowed the Court to maintain the status quo to ensure
proper judicial review. 127 He emphatically rejected the injunction because
the guarding of military secrets at the expense of informed representative
government provided "no real security" for our Republic.
128
Justice Douglas asserted views quite similar to Black's, but he allowed
one exception to the doctrine against prior restraints when the country was
involved in a war declared by Congress, thereby distinguishing the Viet-
nam conflict.129 However, he also noted that there was no statute barring
publication,130 which distinguishes New York Times from The Progres-
sive.
Justice Brennan's opinion is often quoted as being representative of
the holding of the case. He acknowledged that the first amendment could
be abrogated in a "single, extremely narrow" area in time of war to protect
national security.' 3 ' To meet the heavy burden of proof, he required the
Government to show that publication would "inevitably, directly and
immediately" cause a grave event. 32 This required showing is comparable
to the Near description of imperiling the safety of ships already at sea.
However, he felt neither the proof nor the allegations in New York Times
met the exception, and suggested a "nuclear holocaust" and "an event of
that nature" as examples of proof that would meet the standard. 33 This
statement is particularly relevant in light of The Progressive.
In a concurring opinion joined by Justice White, Justice Stewart
asserted that in some circumstances prior restraints would be permissible,
but that here the Government had not met the heavy burden of justifica-
tion. In this context he stated: "I cannot say that disclosure . . . will
surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable damage to our Na-
tion. . . . However, Justice Stewart suggested that his opinion might
have been different if a statute were involved.
35
Justice White's opinion, which Justice Stewart joined, closely follows
Justice Stewart's. White said that in certain circumstances the Government
could impose a prior restraint, but in the absence here of congressional
authorization of one, the Government had not met the burden. 136 He also
expressed his hope that a responsible press would not publish materials
that endanger national security. 137
127. 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971).
128. Id. at 718-19.
129. Id. at 723-24.
130. Id. at 720.
131. Id. at 726.
132. Id. at 726-27.
133. Id. at 725-26.
134. Id. at 730.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 731.
137. Id. at 733.
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Most of Justice Marshall's concurring opinion dealt with the issue of
separation of powers. He concluded that it would be entirely "inconsistent
with the concept of separation of powers" for the Court to allow the
executive's imposition of a prior restraint without congressional
approval. "'
In his dissent Chief Justice Burger declined to consider the merits of
the case. Instead, he chastised the Times for not returning the stolen
documents and for concealing them for three to four months while editing,
implying a justification for prior restraint. 139 Finally, he condemned the
haste with which the litigation took place.
40
Justice Blackmun, dissenting, voiced similar concern with the haste of
the litigation,'14 but endorsed a balancing test to resolve the conflict. 142 He
expressed his fear that disclosure could cause great harm to the nation.
43
Justice Harlan's opinion largely stressed the separation of powers
problem. 44 Like the other dissenting Justices, he condemned the "fever-
ish" speed with which the Court decided the case and listed important
questions of fact, law, and judgment that he felt had received insufficient
consideration. 1
45
II. ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT CASES AND
THEIR EFFECT UPON THE PRESS
A. The Pentagon Papers Cases-Legal Implications and Effect upon the
Press
In his New York Times dissent, Justice Harlan quoted Justice
Holmes' famous comment: "Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For
great cases are called great, not by reason of their importance in shaping
the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate over-
whelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judg-
138. Id. at 742.
139. Id. at 750.
140. Id. at 749, 751.
141. Id. at 760.
142. Id. at 761.
143. Id. at 762.
144. Id. at 755-57.
145. Id. at 753-55. The questions he left unanswered that are particularly relevant to The
Progressive are: (1) Whether the first amendment permits the federal courts to enjoin publication of
stories which would present a serious threat to national security; (2) whether the threat to publish
highly secret documents is of itself a sufficient implication of national security to justify an injunction
on the theory that, regardless of the contents of documents, harm enough results simply from the
demonstration of such a breach of secrecy; (3) whether the unauthorized disclosure of any of these
particular documents would seriously impair the national security; (4) what weight should be given to
high officers in the executive branch of the Government in these actions; (5) whether the threatened
harm to the national security or the Government's possessory interest in the documents justifies the
issuance of an injunction against publication in light of (a) the strong first amendment policy against
prior restraints on publication; (b) the doctrine against enjoining conduct in violation of criminal
statutes; and (c) the extent to which the materials at issue have apparently been otherwise disseminated.
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ment." 46 The Pentagon Papers cases "must be deemed great or hard, orat
least dramatic."'147 However, rather than being bad law, the result was
almost no law at all. The Court was sharply divided and splintered while a
majority was obtained on the narrowest grounds. The result was explained
and justified in a "most cryptic opinion."'' 48
Just how important was the case? Opinions vary, but Professor
Emerson said it was of comparable importance to the John Peter Zenger
Case and that it was "truly a landmark decision.' ' 149 Professor Alexander
M. Bickel, who argued the case for the Times, claimed the decision
increased the press' freedom:
Those freedoms which are neither challenged nor defined are the most secure.
In this sense, for example, it is true that the American press was more free
before it won its battle with the Government in New York Times in 1971 than
after its victory. . . .This was a first attempt at prior restraint. The New
York Times won its case over the Pentagon Papers. But that spell was broken,
and in a sense freedom was thus diminished. But freedom was also extended
in the Pentagon Papers case in that the conditions in which government will
not be allowed to restrain publication are now clearer and perhaps more
stringent than they have been.' 50
Initial press reaction to the decision sounded triumphant. News-
week 51 sported a cover with the headline "Victory for the Press," while the
text inside said, "Few clearer gauges of the sanctity of the first amendment
freedoms, few plainer demonstrations of the openness of American socie-
ty, could be imagined."' 52 However, a smaller article on the next page
cautioned readers that a close reading of the opinions made it clear that the
triumph was far from unqualified. 1
3
Journalist Ben Bagdikian154 commented that the euphoria was unjus-
tified because the decision "probably signalizes not the triumphant end,
but the start of a struggle."' 55 Journalist-lawyer Jack Landau' 56 asserted
146. Id. at 752, 753, 6 quoting Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,400-01 (1904)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
147. Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers,
120 U. PA. L. REV. 271 (1971).
148. Id.
149. Emerson, The First Amendment on Trial- Where We Stand: A Legal View, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., Sept./Oct. 1971, at 38.
150. Bickel, supra note 77, at 60.
151. NEWSWEEK, July 12, 1971.
152. Id. at 16.
153. Id. at 17.
154. Bagdikian was the assistant managing editor for national news at the Washington Post,
author of THE INFORMATION MACHINES (lst ed. 1971) and now teaches journalism at the University of
California Graduate School of Journalism at Berkeley. He is known as one of the nation's foremost
press critics. Bagdikian, supra note 7, at 21; Bagdikian, The First Amendment on Trial- What Did We
Learn?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept./Oct. 1971, at 45.
155. Bagdikian, The First Amendment on Trial-What Did We Learn?, supra note 154.
156. Landau is the director of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the prime
legal defense fund and organization for the American press, Bagdikian, supra note 7, at 23.
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that, far from making the press stronger as Bickel claimed, "the traditional
interpretation of freedom of the press was probably weakened by the
whole affair."
157
Other legal commentators agreed that the decision signaled danger
for the future of the first amendment, Professor Emerson said: "The result
was certainly favorable to a free press. Put the other way, a contrary result
would have been a disaster. . . . The outcome was a sound outcome. On
the other hand, the legal theory that the Court adopted is, I think, cause for
concern."
, 158
And certainly the Court's hodgepodge of opinions was a cause for
concern. Only three Justices-Black, Douglas, and Brennan-were truly
against a prior restraint in nearly all circumstances. Justices White's and
Stewart's opinions left open some very broad exceptions that would
probably allow the Government to obtain an injunction in most cases in
which any substantial issue of national security was raised. Justices Stew-
art, White, Marshall, and even Brennan suggested that they would broad-
en the Near exceptions substantially if there were slight alterations in the
factual setting. The life-threatening nature of the hydrogen bomb in The
Progressive case may be just the small change that would meet the excep-
tion these four Justices had in mind.
On the other hand, the decision suggests that the Government has
authority to classify, but that if it makes a mistake causing the press to
obtain secret documents, it cannot stop the press from publishing those
documents.1 59 This is exactly what The Progressive did, assuming that the
documents Morland used were supposed to be classified. But four
Justices-White, Stewart, Burger, and Blackmun-would probably allow
even this to be overcome if the extremely heavy burden is met. 60
Another important factor in the Pentagon Papers decision is the
substantial difference that congressional action would have made. 61 Two
Justices-White and Stewart-indicated that the Congress could have
passed a law requiring prior restraint in limited circumstances. Justice
White said he would not allow the injunction in the absence of congres-
sional legislation. 62 Justice Stewart said the Congress has the power to
enact such legislation and the Court has the duty to decide its constitution-
ality, and further suggested that he would probably defer to executive or
legislative power.1 63 A third Justice, Justice Marshall, concurred on the
157. THE QUILL, Aug. 1971, at 7.
158. Emerson, supra note 149, at 35.
159. Bickel, supra note 77, at 79.
160. Kalijarvi & Wallace, Executive Authority to Impose Prior Restraint upon Publication of
Information Concerning National Security Affairs: A Constitutional Power, 9 CALIF. W.L. REv. 468,
487 (1973).
161. Note, supra note 79, at 952-53. See also Kalijarvi & Wallace, supra note 160, at 490-91;
Bagdikian, The First Amendment on Trial-What Did We Learn?, supra note 154, at 46.
162. 403 U.S. 713, 732-33 (1971).
163. Id. at 727-30.
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basis that the Court could not "enact" law which the Congress had refused
to pass.
164
Adding the three dissenters' votes to Justices White's and Stewart's,
five Justices in the New York Times Court would have allowed a prior
restraint if a statute had been involved. Four of those five remain on the
Court. In addition, Justice Marshall's opinion leaves open the question
whether a statute in this area could be constitutional.
The Court's affirmance of prior restraint simply because a statute
exists would severely threaten press immunity from prior restraint. This
would be inconsistent with Near, which involved a statute that was struck
down. However, the hypothetical statutory prior restraint here could be
distinguished because it would involve national security. 165 This interpre-
tation partially resulted from the Times arguments themselves. In fact, the
Times argued: "To the extent it is not absolute, the prohibition must at
least presumptively be imposed pursuant to a legislative mandate."
166
The holding may not have limited the press' first amendment rights,
but it did not, despite Bickel's claims, give the press specific standards for
the future. 167 It was inevitable after the Pentagon Papers cases that there
would be future clashes between the press and the Government 168 similar
to what occurred in The Progressive case. It appeared likely the doctrine
would face a rough test in the area of national security. Furthermore, the
per curiam opinion in Pentagon Papers suggested that in the future the
Government could overcome the heavy burden.
The decision left many unanswered questions as the country entered
the 1970s. The case gave no guidance concerning what kind of public
interest would be protected against press publication, what weight should
be given different public interests and the press' interests, or what types of
evidence would meet the Government'- burden.1
69
The case also left unchallenged the Government's right to continue to
classify in the face of evidence of massive over-classification,170 a key issue
that arose again in The Progressive case. The press still has no judicially
sanctioned way to disclose information unnecessarily classified.
The Pentagon Papers decision did change the press' attitudes and
view of its role in society. The press was emerging not only as an activist
critic but as "a powerful fourth party advocate" in the affairs of the
Government. 71 One journalist foresaw the next challenge for the press as
164. Id. at 747.
165. See Note, supra note 79, at 953, for further discussion of this theory.
166. Id. at 953-54,quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971).
167. Kalijarvi & Wallace, supra note 60, at 493.
168. 18 Loy L. REv. 151, 167 (1971-72).
169. Henkin, supra note 147, at 272.
170. Rubin, Foreign Policy, Secrecy, and The First Amendment: The Pentagon Papers In
Retrospect, 17 How. L.J. 579, 610 (1972).
171. Id. at 606.
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avoiding the self-censorship that he feared would come as the press
attempted to avoid future confrontations. 172 The case also pointed to the
deeper problem of Government and press mistrust of each other.173 The
case shows the press was willing to press the issue to the limits, and was not
willing to voluntarily censor itself as it did in World War II and prior to the
Bay of Pigs invasion. 74 The press also seemed more willing to attack the
motives of the nation's leaders.
Perhaps another issue that the decision forced the press to face
squarely was its relationship with the public. Alexander Hamilton once
suggested that liberty of the press depends on the general public opinion,
"and on the general spirit of the people and of the government.' 75 Much of
the public agreed with the Government's New York Times position.
Professor Emerson advised the press to teach the public about the signifi-
cance of the entire system of free expression and suggested that the case
"opened up the possibility of making people aware of what the role of the
press is: that its role isn't simply to take handouts given by the Govern-
ment; it's for the people."'
76
The case had many effects upon the press and its attitudes. It no doubt
reflected the early development of the Court's insensitive attitude toward
the press, further documented in recent Supreme Court decisions that tend
to limit its freedom.177 The decision, although upholding the first amend-
ment, suggested that the future held the likelihood of an exception for a
prior restraint on publication. The doctrine was not tested for eight years.
And then The Progressive case appeared.
B. United States v. The Progressive and Press Reaction to the Case
According to The Progressive's editors and counsel, the case was
based on fear. 78 Fear, the "powerful persuader," made a distinctive impact
upon The Progressive's fellow journalists. This was evident in much of the
press reaction, although eventually most of the press did support The
Progressive out of a different fear-fear of a harmful Supreme Court
decision. Several amicus curiae briefs were submitted to the court of
appeals in favor of The Progressive.1
79
172. Bagdikian, The First Amendment on Trial-What Did We Learn?, supra note 154, at 50.
173. See Note, supra note 79, at 955, for further discussion of the disturbing aspect of the press
not checking with the Government before printing the documents.
174. Developments in the Law, supra note 94, at 1197.
175. Note, supra note 79, at 927, quoting A. HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 535 (B.
Wright ed. 1961).
176. Emerson, supra note 149, at 39.
177. For three recent examples see Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Herbertv.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
178. Public Brief for Appellant at 2, United States v. The Progressive, Nos. 79-1428, 79-1664
(7th Cir. docketed April 12, 1979).
179. On one brief were the P.E.N. American Center, Authors League of American, Committee
for Public Justice, and Scientific American. A second brief included the Association of American
Publishers, the Association of American University Presses, the New York Times, the American
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Despite the support in amicus briefs, a majority of newspapers in the
country came out against publication. Some questioned Knoll's motives. 80
Others felt the existence of one enterprising individual who could get the
information was no reason to give it to the unenterprising as well.1 81 Other
editors believed the story met the Near exception. 18 2 The editors of the
Saturday Review took one of the most drastic positions claiming the
debate was "mortifying" and said "publishing the piece would be a crime
against humanity. . . . To seek to publish such an article, The Progres-
sive's editor must be a fool or a publicity hound, or both-in any event, a
discredit to his tribe."'
' 83
The majority of press criticism was based on the theory that The
Progressive was being irresponsible to the press and press freedom by
taking the risk of pursuing the case to the Supreme Court. In an editorial
entitled "John Mitchell's Dream Case," 184 the Washington Post urged The
Progressive to neither pursue the case nor print the article because it was a
"real first amendment loser which, if they [fought], they seem[ed] almost
certain to lose, given the present judicial climate." The president of the
American Society of Newspaper Editors said the editors were wrong not to
accept mediation, and the head of the Reporter's Committee for Freedom
of the Press agreed they should not pursue the case. 185
Washington Post Editor Ben Bradlee later reversed his position and
agreed to support The Progressive when it appeared the case was definitely
destined for the Supreme Court. He said, however, that he was reluctantly
cornered into supporting The Progressive and that he was doing it "with
about as much enthusiasm as I support Larry Flynt and Hustler."'
186
Examples of similar comments by other newspapers include the
Milwaukee Journal's editor's hope that The Progressive would shelve the
article and drop the case because taking the case to the Court would risk
"converting the lower court defeat into a majestic precedent for the spread
Society of Newspaper Editors, the National Association of Broadcasters, and the Globe Newspaper
Co. A third brief was joined by The Nation, Playboy, National Journal, New York, New West, Juris
Doctor, Inquiry, Working Papers, New York Review of Books, The New Republic, New Engineer,
Focus Midwest, The Village Voice, St. Louis Journalism Review, The Black Scholar, Rolling Stone,
Editor & Publisher, The Witness, Sojourners, The Texas Observer, American Lawyer, Cleveland
Magazine, Seven Days, Transaction, IF. Stone's Weekly, the American Booksellers Association and
the Council for Periodical Distributors Association. The Society of Professional Journalists-Sigma
Delta Chi, the professional journalism organization, took no official stand on the matter.
180. NAT'L REV., March 30, 1979, at 404.
181. The Virginian Pilot, Norfolk, Va., March 28, 1979, reprinted in EDITORIALS ON FILE(Facts
on File, Inc.) 309 (1979).
182. The Evening Bull., Philadelphia, Pa., March 20, 1979, reprinted in EDITORIALS ON FILE
(Facts on File, Inc.) 309 (1979).
183. SATURDAY REV., June 23, 1979, at 52.
184. Wash. Post, March 11, 1979, at c-6, col. I.
185. Bagdikian, supra note 7, at 23.
186. Comment at a symposium sponsored by the Alicia Patterson Foundation. SATURDAY REV.,
June 23, 1979, at 52.
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of censorship and the erosion of press freedom on a hundred fronts. ' '8 7
The Los Angeles Times asserted the case was "the wrong issue, at the
wrong time, in the wrong place."
1 88
A minority of publications, some of which were major newspapers,
did support The Progressive from the beginning. These included the
Chicago Tribune, the St. Louis Post Dispatch, the New York Times, the
Minneapolis Tribune, the Boston Globe, the Columbia Journalism Re-
view, and The Nation. Saying there was more at stake in The Progressive
case than the Pentagon Papers cases, Ben Bagdikian put forth a detailed
and forceful commentary. 8 9 He described the case as "the greatest leap yet
into the destruction of freedom of expression, and consequently of an open
society,'90 and further chided those who claimed it was a bad time to bring
the case by raising the very rational point that the Government does not
bring such suits unless it has decided that it is a bad time for the press to
fight them.' 9' Still others, without directly supporting The Progressive,
criticized the Government for overreaction and carelessness in safeguard-
ing classified material.
192
Overall, the press reacted with a tendency toward hysteria and sensa-
tionalism. Very few publications editorializing on the matter had all the
facts. Of course, with many facts censored by the Government, they were
admittedly difficult to obtain. But the press often resorted to bad reporting
and inaccuracy. The title of the article was often quoted incorrectly.
Unprofessional headlines abounded; for example, one in the Lansing State
Journal read, "You, Too, Can Build H-Bomb."' 93 This type of reporting in
turn resulted in many hostile editorials.
194
The multitude of discussion throughout journalistic and legal circles
about the impact of the case upon the first amendment, the doctrine of
prior restraint, and the press came to a screeching halt on September 17
when the Justice Department announced it was dropping the suit. Reac-
tion was strong and quick. Morland appeared in public wearing his
previously classified T-shirt with the "secret" H-bomb diagram on it.
187. The Milwaukee J., March 28, 1979, reprinted in EDITORIALS ON FILE (Facts on File, Inc.)
310 (1979). See also N.Y. Daily News, March 28, 1979, reprinted in EDITORIALS ON FILE (Facts on File,
Inc.) 309 (1979).
188. L.A. Times, March 13, 1979, Part II, p. 4, col. I, reprinted in EDITORIALS ON FILE (Facts on
File, Inc.) 304 (1979).
189. Bagdikian, supra note 7, at 22-25.
190. Id. at 22.
191. Id. at 24. See also THE NATION, May 12, 1979, at 526, for Knoll's comment that "we can't
keep the [first] amendment in a footlocker until the right Court comes along."
192. THE NEW REPUBLIC, March 24, 1979, at 11. The editors claim the Justice Department
"blundered into a lawsuit that will cause far more harm than if The Progressive had been allowed to
publish without fuss."
193. Lansing State J., March, 1979, as quoted in Bagdikian, supra note 7, at 23. See also the
discussion of the headline in the San Francisco Chronicle which read "A Handy Guide to Building
Your Own H-Bomb." Id.
194. See Bagdikian, supra note 7, at 22, for a fuller critique of the press' reporting of the event.
11871980]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Despite a general sigh of relief that the whole ordeal was over, most of
the press reaction continued to be that of outrage at The Progressive.
Floyd Abrams, who wrote one of the amicus briefs in favor of The
Progressive, criticized the editors for submitting to censorship by forward-
ing a copy of the article to the DOE. 95 Several other newspapers and
publications similarly criticized The Progressive for the way it handled the
matter.1 96 Many other papers continued to criticize The Progressive as
being irresponsible for wanting to publish the article and take the case to
the Court. "There should be some room for editorial responsibility in the
offices of the news media . . .," said The Toledo Blade;197 while the
Atlanta Constitution asserted that "perhaps the most crazies of all," are the
people who wrote and published the article.
198
A much smaller minority of publications ever bothered to criticize the
Government. The National News Council criticized the Government for
the classification system, its reaction to the discovery of UCRLs 4725 and
5280, and its failure to retrieve copies of the article that others had.199
C. Effect of Mooting The Progressive
The dismissal of the case was a fortunate event for the press and first
amendment freedoms. The case was no doubt headed toward being the
"bad law" that Chief Justice Holmes and Justice Harlan predicted.2"0 The
Progressive was about to set an ominous precedent.
The immediate effect of the decision was to create a jubilant atmos-
phere in the offices of The Progressive and the Press Connection. The
Press Connection's managing editor proclaimed it a victory for the first
amendment,01 while The Progressive's editor Knoll commended the Press
Connection for its actions20 2 and claimed: "We believe we have won a small
but important victory in a continuing struggle. 20 3 The Progressive's
editors declared in the November issue, in which the article is printed, that
its publication was a triumph for the first amendment.20 4
195. Abrams, Progressive Education, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov./ Dec. 1979, at 28.
196. See, e.g., Charleston Evening Post, Sept. 20, 1979, reprinted in EDITORIALS ON FILE (Facts
on File, Inc.) 1036 (1979). See also Burkett, The Progressive Case Revisited, THE QUILL, Sept., 1979, at
35-36, in which Knoll claims he was "unhappy" that he followed his attorney's advice in sending copies
to DOE.
197. Tol. Blade, Sept. 19, 1979, reprinted in EDITORIALS ON FILE (Facts on File, Inc.) 1039
(1979).
198. Atlanta Const., Sept. 19, 1979, reprinted in EDITORIALS ON FILE (Facts on File, Inc.) 1033
(1979). See also L.A. Times, Sept. 19,1979, Part II, p. 6, col. 1, reprinted in EDITORIALS ON FILE, supra,
at 1028; and The Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 19, 1979, p. 3, col. 1, reprinted in EDITORIALS ON FILE,
supra, at 1029.
199. COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept./Oct. 1979, at 84. The REvIEw also blamed the Govern-
ment for not keeping the document secret. COLUM. JOURNAL REV. Sept./Oct. 1979, at 24.
200. 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904); 403 U.S. 713, 752-53 (1971).
201. Consoli, supra note 66, at 9.
202. Id.
203. Knoll, Wrestling with leviathan, THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 28.
204. Comment, The 'secret' revealed, THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 6.
[Vol. 41:11651188
PRIOR RESTRAINT
Beyond mere victory celebration the case means much more. One
thing the case and subsequent events did was give the press strength and
encouragement to fight such encroachment of their first amendment
rights. This represents a trend on the part of journalists simply to publish
and not wait for the Government to censor. This may mean the doctrine
prior restraint will never again be considered; it may have reached its
demise. If the Government has realized that it cannot win a case involving a
hydrogen bomb, perhaps it will not try again." 5 If the Government is still
willing to attempt future prior restraints, it is at present difficult to imagine
anything more dangerous than the hydrogen bomb. Additionally, it seems
likely that small, often underground, papers will print almost anything, if
for no other reason than pure shock value. This may happen again if the
Government obtains an injunction against a more widely circulated publi-
cation.
The situation, however, is not quite so simple. The first amendment is
not necessarily any stronger than it was after the Pentagon Papers cases.
The press did not totally win its case, as this was essentially a nonlegal
victory. Instead of being a clear victory for the public or the press, the case
more clearly resembled a circus. Nothing was decided, except that the
Press Connection editors, under intense time pressure, felt an impulsive,
overriding conviction that the article had to be published to preserve the
first amendment freedoms. 20 6 However, the editors' courage derived more
from blinding compulsion than true valor. The negotiations that followed
dismissal of the case actually did more for freedom of the press than all the
preceding events. The negotiations were conducted after The Progressive
filed a motion to open up the documents that had remained sealed at the
end of the case.
It was most sensible that the parties agreed to unseal all the materials
that The Progressive had provided to the Court. With Hansen's help, The
Progressive had proved that the material was found in the public domain.
Moreover, the Government's best argument in the case was that the new
arrangement of the items made it much more harmful to national securi-
ty. 207 Since this "new arrangement" is now published, not only in The
Progressive, but in the Press Connection and the Chicago Tribune, a
newspaper with a large national and international circulation, the individ-
ual items Morland used to compile his piece could no longer feasibly be
considered a security threat.
The affidavits of scientists and other classified material submitted by
the Government presented a more difficult negotiation issue. The Progres-
sive won a great victory for the press by successfully opening up between
205. Abrams, supra note 195, at 29.
206. See McCrea, Reflections-A nation beset by confusion and fear, THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov.
1979, at 36-37, for the editor's views on why he published.
207. Public Brief for Appellee at 52 n. 51, United States v. The Progressive, Nos. 79-1428, 79-
1664 (7th Cir. docketed April 12, 1979).
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ninety and ninety-five percent of the documents. However, an especially
tough issue was UCRL 4725, the accidentally declassified document found
in the Los Alamos library. The document had been submitted to the court
in an appendix to an affidavit. Since the document was in the public
domain at one time, The Progressive argued the right to have it made
public, while the Government argued that the possibility that the docu-
ment was "compromised" for a short time did not justify publication now.
The Government won on this issue, its only victory. The Progressive, by
way of these negotiations, essentially proved its point that over ninety
percent of the information written about the hydrogen bomb is already in
the public domain.
The Progressive also won another victory in that the Government
announced that it would not prosecute anyone for printing the material.
This was perhaps the greatest benefit of the case, and a greater victory for
the Press than the Pentagon Papers cases. Prosecution of any members of
the press could have had a severe chilling effect upon the first amendment.
The Progressive's editors had few worries, because they printed the materi-
al only after very similar material was printed in the Press Connection and
the Chicago Tribune. However, two other groups of persons faced the
possibility of prosecution. One group was the scientists that Hansen
claimed violated the Atomic Energy Act by transmitting restricted data in
conversations with Morland and others. These convictions, however,
would have little effect upon the press, other than to potentially dry up
information sources in the future.
The other group that potentially faced prosecution was Hansen and
the editors of the Press Connection. Their prosecution, despite the merits
of the case, could have had a definite chilling effect upon the press. It is
possible that the Justice Department considered prosecution merely as
harassment and as a warning to future potential offenders. This would
no doubt have had a detrimental impact upon the press.20 8 If the Govern-
ment had prosecuted, the case would have turned on the ability to prove
the information came solely from public sources. If Hansen could prove
this, it seems unlikely the Government could have won its case. If, however,
the Government proved Hansen obtained some materials illegally and
convicted him, this might not have necessarily reflected upon the press
itself.
The Government, however, might have tried to prosecute and convict
Hansen without proving he obtained the materials illegally, but rather by
use of a frighteningly broad interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act.
Under the Government's interpretation of the Act suggested in The Pro-
gressive case, all materials on nuclear energy, including articles which
aggregate several items from public sources and consequently created a
threat in the eyes of DOE officials, would be considered "born classi-
208. See text accompanying notes 237-41 infra for a discussion of the future use of convictions.
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fied.,, 20 9 All materials on the subject would have to be "declassified" by the
DOE. This procedure would have staggering potential for abuse by the
DOE censors. Under this interpretation, Hansen could have been prose-
cuted for simply being industrious enough to compile the various public
sources of information into one concise article. Whether or not the Court
would actually accept this interpretation would depend on further inter-
pretation of several elements of the Act.210
Prosecution of the Press Connection, however, would have depended
upon an interpretation of different wording of the Act. Section 2274
requires that information be "communicated, transmitted or disclosed."
The New York Times Court interpreted the same phrase in the Espionage
Act, and found that the pertinent provision merely said "communicates"
and not "publishes," while other sections of the statute had distinguished
the two words; and that consequently the statute did not apply to the press
since the press only "publishes., 21 This same interpretation problem
might have arisen if the Justice Department had attempted to prosecute
the newspaper under the Atomic Energy Act.
Although the Government did not prosecute The Progressive, it may
have other plans to intimidate the editors. After the Pentagon Papers cases
were over, the FBI ordered an investigation into the background of the
Times reporter who broke the story. The Government also summoned
numerous Vietnam war critics before grand juries to determine what
evidence could be uncovered. 1 2
Another important effect that mooting of the case had upon the press
was a change in attitudes. The intense criticism of Knoll for his use of
"informal clearance" by submitting the article to DOE no doubt raised his
awareness, as well as the rest of the press', of the journalistic ethic: if one
truly believes in printing something he is certain is in the public domain,
one should not submit to government censorship first. The case also made
the press realized that it was likely the Government's true motives were to
cover up its own mistakes and inconsistent policies on classification.213
This made the press, and hopefully the public, realize that the topic of
nuclear weaponry should not be totally off-limits to the press and that it
has a responsibility to its readers to report the subject more fully than it has
previously done.
The Columbia Journalism Review, after disclosing that it too had
209. Public Brief for Appellee at 74 n.74, 82, 87-88, 105-06 & n.102, United States v. The
Progressive, Nos. 79-1428, 79-1664 (7th Cir. docketed April 12, 1979).
210. See text accompanying notes 242-65 infra for a discussion of the future of the Atomic
Energy Act.
211. Comment, supra note 93, at 219-20 n.41. See 403 U.S. 713, 721 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
212. See Rubin, supra note 170, at 580-81, for a detailed discussion of further harassment of
journalists by the Justice Dept. following the Pentagon Papers.
213. Cook, Publishers Statement, Chi. Tribune, Sept. 18, 1979 at 12, col. 3.
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found the secret, stated the issue succinctly: "Let us be clear; we weren't
hungry for this knowledge . . . [but consequently], in our ignorance [the]
journalists [have] never probed the limits of public nuclear knowledge
... . [They] were content to delegate to leaders and experts the right to
know, and therefore the freedom to decide. 214 Perhaps, if the case did
nothing else, it made the press realize it must open its eyes or risk losing
first amendment rights. This case helped remind America how unevenly
knowledge is held and controlled in this nation.215 To put some of this
control, and consequently power, back with the people, the press has
realized a need to take more assertive action to gain the knowledge.
III. THE FUTURE
The Progressive case not only had immediate effects upon the press,
but will undoubtedly have reverberating effects in the future. The case has
changed the doctrine of prior restraint. Although we may see increasing
government censorship in different forms, this will not be the final attempt
at a government restraint on publication. New technology will raise new
issues, and if the Government determines such technology to be equally or
more harmful than the hydrogen bomb, the prior restraint doctrine may
come into widespread use. The Atomic Energy Act has yet to be tested. Its
future is uncertain. The Government may rely more and more on convic-
tions, and the Congress may take other legislative actions. These are issues
that must be considered for the future.
A. The Case Will Arise Again
Professor Emerson once said that "unless the doctrine of prior re-
straint is given a more rational and comprehensive form, it is likely to be
whittled away in future decisions. 216 The doctrine may have been whittled
away by The Progressive case. It is difficult to imagine anything more
dangerous than a hydrogen bomb; however, the possibility remains that
something will arise in future technology that the Government will attempt
to censor by resurrecting the doctrine of prior restraint. Two examples of
this are biochemical warfare and recombinant-DNA technology. This
technology is not in the future-it is with us now.
Congress has recently been studying proposals for renewing
recombinant-DNA research.217 The thought that perhaps man will some-
day be able to control life, reaching into the science fiction world of
creating life and cloning, is immensely frightening and, like the hydrogen
bomb, has dire consequences for the welfare of the world. Looking ahead,
214. Comment, supra note 64, at 22.
215. Id. at 22-23.
216. Emerson, supra note 76, at 671.
217. Ferguson, Scientific Inquiry & the First Amendment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 639,657 (1979).
See H.R. 1005, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1978).
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with some imagination as to future technology, it becomes easier to see the
same issue developing. It is possible that publication of this technology
could give the information to those who would use it for destructive
purposes. At the same time, recombinant-DNA research provokes serious
issues that should be publicly discussed.1 8
This future scenario has many similarities to The Progressive case.
Although DNA technology may not have the ability to cause as immediate
and massive destruction as the hydrogen bomb, it is not something we
would want in the hands of radical terrorists or Idi Amin; 19 yet, under-
standing of scientific information and knowledge in the past has not
harmed the public. Galileo's confirmation that the earth revolved around
the sun caused no real harm to society. A more recent example is attempts
to suppress Darwin's theory on the evolution of man. His information
caused much turmoil because of the conflict with religious beliefs, but did
not cause any real harm in terms of danger to citizens or the threat of death.
These examples are not necessarily fair analogies. A better one is atomic
energy, the precursor of the hydrogen bomb.
Much of the knowledge of atomic energy has been distributed to the
public, as suggested by Einstein. 2 ° Although the benefits of nuclear energy
are a topic of continuing debate, this knowledge has been used, not with
the intention to harm, but with the intention to help the nation. This is
quite similar to the issue of DNA research. Even though it has the potential
to harm, it could also be used in many beneficial ways. Those opposed to
this view would argue, however, that, like atomic energy, DNA research's
risks would outweigh its benefits. The risk of a Hitler controlling the world
by gene manipulation might be too great to allow information on DNA to
be made public.
Another factor that makes The Progressive case similar to this hypo-
thetical future case is the fact that scientific opinion is greatly divided on
recombinant-DNA research; thus it would be extremely difficult for a
court to ascertain the true danger it involves. This would make it easier for
the Government to seek an injunction against dissemination of the infor-
mation by merely showing the potential danger is sufficiently grave,
although of indeterminate risk of occurrence.22 1 The New York Times
Court required a showing, not only of grave harm, but also immediate
harm. If the Court took this approach, it would be lowering the New York
Times standard and creating the potential for a major increase in success-
ful prior restraints. A great deal of information could be shown to have
potentially grave danger at some indeterminate time in the future, but not
immediately.
218. Id.
219. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
220. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
221. Ferguson, supra note 217, at 658.
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As an alternative, the Government might restrain the actual research
itself. The Government has already attempted to prevent research on
indecipherable computer communication codes because it might enable
foreign powers to develop an impenetrable system. The Commerce De-
partment imposed a secrecy order on the research but has since lifted it.
222
Therefore, although the technology of the future may not have the
power to cause immediate massive death, as does the hydrogen bomb, the
Government will have valid reasons for wanting to keep secrets, and the
public and press will have equally valid reasons to want knowledge on the
subject. The Progressive conflict has not ended.
B. Possible Supreme Court Reaction
Since there is still a real possibility of this type of press-government
conflict in the future, it is necessary to consider what the Supreme Court
would do if the case arose while its present members are on the bench.
First, one must remember that the New York Times Court declared that
the Government must meet a heavy burden of presumption against it. In
New York Times Justices White, Stewart, and Brennan, who all remain on
the Court, required a finding that the enjoined materials "will surely" or
223
"inevitably" cause the requisite harm.
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,224 a more recent prior
restraint case that did not involve national security, the Court reaffirmed
the heavy burden standard, and at least six Justices implicity agreed to the
"direct, immediate and irreparable harm" standard. Justice Brennan first
laid out the standard in which Justices Stewart and Marshall concurred.225
Justice Powell implicitly agreed in his opinion.226 Justice White did not
specifically discuss the standards but expressed doubts that a prior re-
straint could ever by imposed.227 Justice Stevens also subscribed to Justice
Brennan's opinion,228 which makes a total of six justices who would
definitely require the heavy burden under "direct, immediate and irrepar-
able harm" standards. However, Nebraska Press did not deal with national
security, and in New York Times the Court suggested they would agree to
prior restraint if there was legislation permitting it.229 In a future situation,
the Court also could possibly distinguish the Pentagon Papers cases as
entirely a matter of executive authority and separation of powers.230
222. Id. at 660.
223. 403 U.S. 713, 730, 726-27 (1971).
224. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
225. Id. at 593.
226. Id. at 571.
227. Id. at 570.
228. Id. at 617.
229. See text accompanying notes 161-66 supra.
230. See Junger, Down Memory Lane: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 23 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 3 (1971), for a thorough discussion of the view that the Pentagon Papers case was a separation of




Would the Court in a future case impose a prior restraint? In light of
the makeup of the present Court, the standards coming out of New York
Times and Nebraska Press, and the seeming willingness of many Justices
to defer to legislative judgment, it is very possible the Court would uphold
a prior restraint under the Atomic Energy Act or a similar act.
The two Justices who had the strongest views against prior restraint in
New York Times, Justices Black and Douglas, are no longer on the Court,
while two of the three dissenters from New York Times do remain. Two
new members, Justices Powell and Stevens, would probably follow the
"direct, immediate and irreparable harm" standards. Justice Rehnquist
would most likely follow fellow conservative dissenter Chief Justice Burg-
er.
Nor has the Court in recent times been particularly friendly to the
press. The Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,231' Herbert v. Lando,232 and Gannett
v. DePasquale233 decisions are three examples of the Court's attempts to
limit the press, without actually imposing on the first amendment. In
Zurcher, the Court held the societal interest in law enforcement out-
weighed the press' right to contest a search of its offices before any actual
search and seizure takes place. Herbert was a public figure defamation
case. The Court held the plaintiff could, during discovery, ask the defen-
dant journalist about his state of mind when publishing the alleged defam-
atory matter and rejected the press' claim that it needed a special "editorial
privilege." The Gannett Court held, 5-4, that members of the public, and
consequently the press, had no constitutional right to attend pretrial
hearings in a criminal case. These decisions, which appear to have restrict-
ed the press in three different areas, leave even more doubt as to how the
Court would react in a situation similar to The Progressive.
Two obscure footnotes in United States v. Snepp234 may also suggest
the Court's willingness to impose prior restraint. In that case, the defen-
dant had been a CIA agent who had violated his secrecy pledge by
publishing information about the agency's actions in Vietnam. Although
the case turned on the breach of contract issue, the footnotes suggest that
even without a contract, national security agencies could suppress the
publication of sensitive information.
In a recent address given after The Progressive case was mooted,
Justice Brennan criticized the press for overreaction to Herbert, and spoke
of two "models" of free speech. 235 The first, which he called the "speech
model," concerned the actual right to speak out. The other, the "structural
model," concerned the gathering of information and preparation by the
231. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
232. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
233. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
234. 444 U.S. 507, 508, nn. 1-2. See NEWSWEEK, Mar. 3, 1980, at 51.
235. Address by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Dedication of Samuel I. Newhouse Law
Center, Rutgers University, Newark, N.J. (Oct. 17, 1979), reprinted in 5 MED. L. REP. 1837 (1979).
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press. He indicated that such areas as the privilege to withhold confidential
sources and the search and seizure of newspaper offices dealt with prepara-
tion and therefore fell under the "structural model." Morland's research,
which the Government claimed dealt with the piecing together of indivi-
dual items to "give birth" to an article which was much more dangerous
than the individual pieces alone, might fall under the "structural model"
that Brennan appeared willing to suppress. Brennan made no mention,
however, of The Progressive or potential similar cases.
If a case similar to The Progressive ever reaches the Supreme Court,
the outcome would probably turn, as it did in this case, on evidentiary
proof that the material was already in the public domain. Opinions vary on
whether the Government could have proved this to the Supreme Court in
The Progressive. The Government already had the benefit of the district
court opinion. On the other hand, The Progressive had the advantage of
the discovery of UCRLs 4725 and 5280. It is largely academic to discuss
what could have happened in The Progressive, but the case does serve to
emphasize the importance of the public domain issue in the future.
If a similar case reaches the Supreme Court, the Court will undoubt-
edly have to consider whether the Court, Government, or press should
decide what information on a particular subject is necessary for public
debate. It will then have to wrestle with the major policy argument that
technical information, like that in The Progressive case, is not necessary
for a sufficiently informed public debate on issues like thermonuclear
weaponry and DNA research. This is a forceful argument that is supported
236by many journalists. The Court must look, however, to the opposing
arguments. Even though this information may be unnecessary for an
informed public debate, suppression of information compromises one of
the greatest constitutional principles of our nation-freedom of speech
and the press.
Without publishing the hydrogen bomb article, The Progressive
would not have fully proved the point that the Government has not
satisfactorily protected its citizens. Simply printing a statement that the
magazine's writers had discovered the information would obviously not
have been as effective. But the question still remains whether the shock
value benefits of printing the technical information to expose the Govern-
ment's use of secrecy to stifle debate on policy outweighed the potential
harm. If one accepts the view that information in The Progressive case was
already in the public domain, the benefits of exposition of Government
error can be seen to outweigh the damage. On the other hand, if one
accepts the view that the information was not totally in the public domain,
one can believe the potential harm does outweigh the benefits. The public
domain factor is therefore the key upon which a future Supreme Court
decision might turn.




The Court will most likely follow the New York Times standard of
"inevitable, direct and immediate" harm. If the material has already been
available in the public domain, the Court could find that any harm has
already occurred, and consequently, further publication, although possi-
bly aggravating the harm, could not cause the "inevitable, direct and
immediate" harm New York Times required. If the material has not
previously been in the public domain, such as the Pentagon Papers, the
case would'probably be decided by the New York Times test and the
constitutionality of statutes that require the classification of the informa-
tion.
Policy, however, could influence the Court. If so, there is a remote
possibility that the Court would find technical information, like some
other forms of speech including obscenity, not to be constitutionally
protected speech. Because of the importance to the national interest and
general public of any topic likely to be raised in this context, and in light of
the Court's reiteration of the heavy burden standard in Nebraska Press
Association, it is doubtful the Court would decide the case this way.
C. Use of Convictions
If the Government does shy away from the use of prior restraint, it
may take a different approach and make greater use of prosecutior and
threats of prosecution in order to discourage publication. If imposed fre-
quently or abusively, the criminal sanction can become just as chilling as
the prior restraint. The deterrence threat can substantially chill in advance,
creating the same effect as a prior restraint. 7 Another major problem with
criminal sanctions is their tendency to induce self-censorship.238
Furthermore, if the Government resorts to criminal sanctions, it is
very likely that the Court would apply a lesser standard tojudge criminali-
ty of a publication than it does in judging a prior restraint. In New York
Times Justices Brennan, 239 Stewart, 240 and White24' expressed the belief
that a new, less-restrictive standard could be used. Consequently the
Government could more likely obtain convictions than prior restraint
orders. In addition, in a criminal case ajury might be even less sympathetic
to a defendant because the general public does not see the need to publish
such "harmful" information.
D. Constitutionality of the Atomic Energy Act
If another case arose involving the dissemination of information on
237. For a detailed discussion of the prior-subsequent restraint dichotomy see Murphy, The
Prior Restraint Doctrine in the Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 51 NoTRE DAME LAW. 898 (1976).
238. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term-Freedom of Speech, Press, and Association, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 199, 208 (1971).
239. 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971).
240. Id. at 730.
241. Id. at 740.
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nuclear weapons, one of the foremost issues would be the constitutionality
of the Atomic Energy Act. The Act has never been tested, and has been
described as remaining to be a "First Amendment minefield. ' 42
During The Progressive case, the Government propounded a very
sweeping interpretation of the Act, embracing a broad definition of re-
stricted data which required that all information on the subject be "born
classified" and essentially claimed that no technical information was
entitled to first amendment protection.243 The Government's reading of the
Act could have potentially rendered criminal "the words of any critic, in
academe or elsewhere, who, without access to classified information,
happens upon-or creates-a bit of information which some government
official believes harmful . . ,244 Knoll said the Act could possibly be
used to keep information from the public about Three Mile Island.2 41 If
this interpretation is to be believed, the Act's powers are extremely danger-
ous to first amendment freedoms.
The Government would most likely argue, as it did in The Progressive
case,2 46 that the legislative mandate allows the DOE to balance a number
of factors in making its classification decisions, including "the unpublished
state of the art," and would suggest further that there should be judicial
deference to this situation when there has been a broad congressional
determination of grave injury. 47 This argument, however, appears fore-
closed by Landmark Communications v. Virginia,248 in which the Su-
preme Court recently held it would not give deference to legislative find-
ings when first amendment rights are at stake.249
Undoubtedly the Government would argue that technical data is not
deserving of first amendment protection. The Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Edler Industries, Inc.z1° upheld licensing requirements for arms
exporters and ruled that Congress has constitutional power to prevent the
dissemination of technical data. However, the court specifically avoided
interference with protected speech and limited it to the facts of the case
where the communication was for Edler's private economic benefit only. A
careful reading of the case shows that it does not aid the Government's
argument, but might still be construed as giving a right to limit technical
242. Abrams, supra note 195, at 28.
243. Public Brief for Appellee at 74 n.74, 82, 87-88, 105-06 n.102, United States v. The Progres-
sive, Nos. 79-1428, 79-1664 (7th Cir. docketed April 12, 1979).
244. See Friedman, supra note 13, at 35, quoting Abrams' amicus brief for the New York imes
and for others.
245. Knoll, If..., THE QUILL, June, 1979, at 31.
246. Public Brief for Appellee at 35, United States v. The Progressive, Nos. 79-1428, 79-1664
(7th Cir. docketed April 12, 1979).
247. Id. at 90.
248. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
249. Id. at 1544.
250. 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978).
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speech by a court dealing with a threat of great injury from thermonuclear
weapons.
The Act itself has two levels of graded offenses. In section 2274(a) one
of the requirements for conviction is that the person communicate, trans-
mit, or disclose the information "with intent to injure the United States" or
"secure an advantage to a foreign nation." The lesser offense in section
2274(b) requires that the person do so "with reason to believe such data will
be utilized to injure the United States [or] secure an advantage to a foreign
nation." The statute's injunction requirements are vague, however. In
section 2280 the Government can apply for an injunction whenever in the
judgment of the Commission (now the DOE) "any person had engaged or
is about to engage in acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a
violation of any provision" of the Act.
Three interpretations of these injunction provisions can be argued,
two of which are very destructive of the first amendment. One argument,
which the Government forcefully asserted in The Progressive case, is that
the "reason to believe" or "intent" standards need be met for criminal
prosecution but not for an injunction.251 The Government claimed that all
it must prove for an injunction is that the material falls under the definition
of restricted data. If this interpretation were followed by the Supreme
Court, which appears highly unlikely, the Government could obtain an
injunction any time it desired. The defendant would essentially be enjoined
without any notice, and most likely for items that have been discovered in
the public domain. The Government could selectively claim the right to
prior restraint, establishing a doctrine reminiscent of the historical licens-
ing laws that led to great abuse.
This should also be considered in the light of the Government's
tendency to overclassify. It has been suggested that only five to ten percent
of classified materials should be so classified.252 Since the Court in Land-
mark took the position against complete deference to the legislative or
executive branches, the Court probably would require a greater showing to
impose even a temporary prior restraint. Otherwise, the Act would not
meet the standards for due process procedural safeguards.
A second interpretation of the Act's provision is that the "reason to
believe" standard is required for an injunction; however, the mere fact that
the publication contained restricted data and the Government had warned
the defendant of the impending injunction would be sufficient notice for
the defendant to have "reason to believe" the publication could be injur-
ious to the United States.253 This interpretation sounds more logical, but is
251. Public Brief for Appellee at 31, United States v. The Progressive, Nos. 79-1428, 79-1664
(7th Cir. docketed April 12, 1979).
252. See text accompanying notes 269-81 infra for a discussion of overclassification and
classification schemes in the future.
253. Public Brief for Appellee at 16, 39, United States v. The Progressive, Nos. 79-1428,79-1664
(7th Cir. docketed April 12, 1979).
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nearly as absurd. The "reason to believe" standard requires more than the
Government telling the defendant that he has a reason to believe.254 Partic-
ularly in a situation like The Progressive, if the defendant truly obtained
the information from the public domain, he would have no reason to
believe this information could cause harm.255
The Surpeme Court in 1941 in Gorin v. United States256 faced a
similar question with the Espionage Act. Interpreting the predecessor to
sections 793(b) and 794(a) of the Espionage Act,257 the Court held the
definition of "connected with the national defense" not to be unconstitu-
tionally vague, but based this finding on the fact that the statute also
required proof of intent or reason to believe disclosure would injure the
nation or aid a foreign country. Without this interpretation, the Court
recognized there might be a vagueness problem.258 Likewise, for the
Atomic Energy Act to be interpreted in a constitutional manner, the
Supreme Court should use a third interpretation of the Act, and require a
finding of scienter.259 The Gorin case, however, concerned a criminal
prosecution, and not an injunction; but without use of a similar interpreta-
tion requiring a specific finding of "reason to believe" or "intent," the Act,
like the Espionage Act, would be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
The Court should interpret the definition of "restricted data" narrow-
ly. Section 2014(y) of the Atomic Energy Act broadly defines it as all data
concerning the design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons, but
excludes all declassified materials.260 In The Progressive case, as could
potentially be argued in future cases, the Government asserted that the
definition required all information, all knowledge-theoretical or
practical-to be classified automatically and remain so until the Govern-
ment declassifies it. This "classified at birth" concept could feasibly cover
not only ajournalist's, like Morland's, original work product, but a private
scientist's independent research and a university professor's deductive
reasoning. A professor could not even teach the principles of nuclear
physics.261 The Government in The Progressive case rebutted this argu-
254. Public Brief for Appellant at 57, United States v. The Progressive, Nos. 79-1428, 79-1664
(7th Cir. docketed April 12, 1979).
255. Id. at 16. Nor could the Government show the documents could "surely" or "inevitably"
lead to "irreparable harm" if they had been in the public domain for years. Public Supplemental Brief
for Appellant at 24, United States v. The Progressive, Nos. 79-1428, 79-1664 (7th Cir. docketed April
12, 1979).
256. 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
257. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(b), 794(a) (1979).
258. 312 U.S. 19,26-28 (1941). For further discussion see Developments in the Law, supra note
94, at 1237.
259. 312 U.S. 19, 26-28 (1941). See Developments in the Law, supra note 94, at 1237.
260. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(y):
The term "restricted data" means all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization
of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special
nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or
removed from the Restricted Data category pursuant to section 2162 of this title.
261. Public Brief for Appellant at 66, United States v. The Progressive, Nos. 79-1428,79-1664
(7th Cir. docketed April 12, 1979).
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ment with the notion that Morland did not "give birth" to the information;
hence, The Progressive was overreacting.26 a This argument perhaps
stretches the reality of what the Government would do, but not the reality
of what it could do. The wording of the Act leaves open the potential for
abuse. Unless the Supreme Court were to interpret this definition narrow-
ly, almost anything, including facts of Three Mile Island, storage of
nuclear waste, the discovery of missing uranium from a Tennessee plant,
and other pressing nuclear issues could be hidden from the public.
The Court has always been cautious with first amendment cases. In
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button263 the Court held that Congress must legislate with
precision and "narrow specificity" when attempting to regulate first
amendment freedom. If Congress is required to legislate with precision, the
Court, in order to save the statute's constitutionality, should interpret it
with the same precision. The statute would not be constitutional if inter-
preted in the broad manner the Government suggested in The Progressive.
Under the Government's interpretation the executive branch would be left
with an unconstitutional, unlimited, discretionary power to censor. The
Court follows a well-known policy of interpreting statutes narrowly in
order to save their constitutionality, and must do so to save the Atomic
Energy Act.
Congress intended to protect our nuclear secrets.264 However, the
statute itself proclaims that the intention of the Act is to encourage the
dissemination of atomic energy information for scientific and industrial
progress and for public debate.265 The Progressive was mooted, but the
first amendment may still be in danger unless the Act is narrowly con-
strued.
E. Due Process Requirements
While The Progressive case was in the district court and The Progres-
sive was preparing its case on the motion to vacate, the district court
refused discovery and refused to allow testimony and cross-examination at
the hearing. The Progressive was also prevented from having access to the
previously open library or its employees. These issues are too complex to
be discussed in this context. However, it is appropriate to note that ifa case
of this type does arise in the future, the Supreme Court may be faced with a
situation where the defendant has been denied these same procedural
safeguards.
262. Public Brief for Appellee at 105, United States v. The Progressive, Nos. 79-1428, 79-1664
(7th Cir. docketed April 12, 1979).
263. 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
264. For the legislative history of the Act, S. Rep. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3456, 3467.
265. 42 U.S.C. § 2161(b):
The dissemination of scientific and technical information relating to atomic energy should be
permitted and encouraged so as to provide that free interchange of ideas and criticism which
is essential to scientific and industrial progress and public understanding and to enlarge the
fund of technical information.
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Courts have broad discretion in the discovery process at preliminary
stages of the judicial system. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether this
discretion can be so broad that a party is effectively denied all the informa-
tion it needs to defend itself. In these situations the Government definitely
holds the upper hand. The Government employs the vast majority of the
scientists who are competent to testify, the Government holds all classified
materials, and the Government has the power to remove even unclassified
materials from public access. This unfairness should be recognized and
compensated for by allowing broader discovery and live testimony during
the in camera hearings at the early stages of the litigation.
F. Congressional Reaction
It can be expected that this case will have some effect upon Congress.
In fact, it did even before the case was mooted. After the discovery of
UCRL 4725, a Senate subcommittee held hearings to investigate the
Government's release of classified information.2 6
It is unclear whether Congress will take any steps to change the Act.
One commentator has suggested that legislation on national security
should treat differently the various groups of people who could violate the
acts-such as spies, government employees, government ex-employees,
26and the press. 67 If a reporter is unaware the information he has received is
stolen or is told it is not classified by an expert who is under orders not to
reveal classified information, the standard for the press' punishment
should be different from the punishment for a government employee who
should know he is violating the law. On the other hand, if the press has
knowledge the information was illegally obtained, as in the Pentagon
Papers cases, a different punishment standard is needed. It has also been
suggested that Congress provide specific guidance regarding the enumerat-
ed types of publication that can be enjoined.268
Another area in which the Congress may attempt to legislate, and that
the executive branch will most likely reconsider, is classification proce-
dures. Officials in both branches had to face the fact that government error
was the primary cause of The Progressive case. As one commentator
noted: "The DOE officials .. .have been graphically shown that their
recipe was less well-guarded than Coca-Cola's secret formula or Colonel
Sander's ingredients for finger-lickin' southern fried chicken. 269 If the
whole affair did nothing else, it undoubtedly awakened the DOE to the
glaring reality that its classification system is not working. The system has
a long, historical background with a complex, essentially common-law
basis for its authority.270 The major problem with the classification system
266. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
267. Espionage Statutes, 73 COLUM. LAw REv. 929, 1083-85 (1973).
268. Developments in the Law, supra note 94, at 1242.
269. Lewin, How a Legal Bomb Works, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 24, 1979, at 12.
270. For an extremely detailed history of the classification scheme in the United States, see
Developments in the Law, supra note 94, at 1196-1202.
1202 [Vol. 41:1165
PRIOR RESTRAINT
is that it has gotten extremely out of hand. One retired Pentagon security
officer has estimated that only one to five percent of currently classified
documents should be.271 Former Ambassador to the United Nations
Arthur Goldberg testified that only ten percent of the classified docu-
ments he had read should have been classified. 72 The Government does
not even know itself how much material is classified, although it is esti-
mated at twenty million documents at the Department of Defense, one
hundred million in the defense industry, and two million at the State De-
partment. 273 A total of thirty-four departments' directors and subordinates
have authority to classify.21 4 In the Department of Defense alone, 803 of-
ficials have the authority to classify "top secret" documents; 7,600 have
authority to classify "secret" documents; and 31,000 have authority to
classify "confidential" documents.275
Another consequence of overclassification in which Congress contin-
ually acquiesces is the use of leaks to get classified information to Con-
gress, particularly for appropriations bills. Information is also frequently
leaked to the press, tending to create a system of "informal declassifica-
tion. 276 If Congress and the executive branch were to take efforts to scale
down the extent of classification, it would not have to break its own rules.
There is no doubt a need for some secrecy and classification. Classifi-
cation is needed to protect the national safety and security by the aiding of
covert intelligence, for diplomatic relations, to keep friendly nations from
being reluctant to share information (which is what happened after the
Pentagon Papers cases), to open channels of communications between
hostile nations, and to protect the Government bargaining position at
diplomatic talks.277 But if secrecy becomes excessive it defeats its own
purpose. The press will begin to ignore it more and more. As Justice
Stewart said in New York Times, maximum possible disclosure is the way
to maintain secrecy.278
The press exposed the weaknesses of the classification system in The
Progressive case. But that does not mean it can do so every time. Certainly
some information needs to be concealed, but much of what should not be
concealed will never be discovered by the press.
One proposed method to eliminate overclassification is to provide for
automatic declassification of many categories of documents, putting the
burden on the bureaucracy to determine and maintain the need for reclas-
271. Kalijarvi & Wallace, supra note 160, at 493.
272. Developments in the Law, supra note 94, at 1201.
273. Id. at 1200-01.
274. Id. at 1200.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1206. See also Bagdikian, The First Amendment on Trial-What Did We Learn?,
supra note 154, at 47.
277. Developments in the Law, supra note 94, at 1191.
278. 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971).
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sification. 279 Another method would be to provide more specific criteria
for classification and to create an administrative review board independent
of the executive branch.280
It is up to the Government to act in the near future to correct the
problems in the classification system. Both Congress and the executive
branch have authority to regulate disclosure, 281 and should consider the
problem immediately.
G. The Press in the Future
Finally, it is important to look at what this case will mean for the press
and individual journalists in the future. The first thing the press should do,
if responsible, is to begin a thorough debate28 2 so that the public can
effectively understand what this whole ordeal has meant. The press of the
future will undoubtedly take a larger role in informing the public on
nuclear energy issues and, in particular, the dangers from such easy access
to hydrogen bomb "blueprints." This is extremely crucial in light of Three
Mile Island, nuclear waste spills, and the discovery of missing uranium.
On the issue of prior restraint, Professor Emerson suggested after
New York Times that, as a practical matter, all the press need do to protect
itself is not tell the Government in advance. Certainly, more editors in the
future will follow their journalistic instincts to publish and not seek
censorship when they honestly believe there is a public right to the material
and that it consequently cannot endanger national security.
The press also has to do some soul-searching concerning what is and is
not responsible journalism. Assuming arguendo that The Progressive's
information was in the public domain, the magazine had a right to print the
material. But the next case might be different. If there is truly a risk of harm
to our nation, the press has an ethical and moral responsibility to weigh the
potential harm against any benefit the publication of technical informa-
tion might have. No doubt, many editors in the future will be reevaluating
their ideas and policies.
The press certainly has less trust for Government after The Progres-
sive case. In the future, the press will most likely take a more cautious ap-
proach toward accepting government hand out publicity without further
investigative searches into what is being improperly hidden from the public
eye. The press has a duty to have respect for the Government, as does the
Government for the press.283 But mutual respect is neither mutual depend-
279. Henkin, supra note 147, at 280.
280. See Developments in the Law, supra note 94, at 1227-31, for a detailed discussion of this
proposal.
281. The presidential powers come from the inherent executive power, U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 1;
Congress' power arises from its power to establish additional offices "by law," U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2;
Henkin, supra note 147, at 280 n.29.
282. Bagdikian, supra note 7, at 24-25.
283. Comment, New York Times Co. v. United States: Confrontation Between Free Press and
Presidential Power, 20 Loy. L. Rav. 140, 147 (1974).
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ence nor total cooperation. A healthy, adversary-type relationship is
necessary. This antagonism between the two institutions is the nation's
means of existence284 upon which our democracy depends. The press also
has other duties of which it should be aware. It has a duty to inform its
public of all information it deems important. The public has a right to




The Progressive was not an ordinary case. It almost became a "great
case." If a permanent prior restraint had resulted, it no doubt would have
been a "bad" case for the press and a cataclysmic blow to the first amend-
ment. But the prior restraint that the press feared most never ensued.
Instead, the case turned out to be a learning tool. It taught a lot of people
and two great institutions-the Government of the United States and the
free press-many lessons. Everyone learned that there is no certain answer
to first amendment questions. The Government was forced to realize its
own ineptitude, and the press learned the age-old maxim that power is
knowledge.286
The Columbia Journalism Review best summed up the issue by first
quoting Robert Penn Warren:
The end of man is knowledge, but there is one thing he can't know. He can't
know whether knowledge will save him or kill him. He will be killed, all right,
but he can't know whether he is killed because of the knowledge which he has
got or because of the knowledge which he hasn't got and which if he had it,
would save him. There's a cold in your stomach, but you open the envelope,
you have to open the envelope, for the end of man is to know.
and then commenting:
Universal knowledge is no more and no less dangerous than democracy itself.
We have chosen the risks of democracy, and it is time that we accept the risk
of informing ourselves. The Progressive has broken the seal and ripped open
the envelope, and that is a historic accomplishment. It may make us uneasy,
but this is an anxiety we must learn to suffer.287
Belinda J. Scrimenti
284. Id. at 141.
285. Bagdikian, The First Amendment on Trial- What Did We Learn?, supra note 154, at 50.
286. Kalijarvi & Wallace, supra note 160, at 469. In a letter to W. T. Barry written by James
Madison on Aug. 4, 1822, Madison said: "A people who mean to be their own governors must arm
themselves with the power knowledge gives. A popular government without popular information or
the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy or perhaps both."
287. Comment, supra note 64, at 23.
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